Plant Relocation: Viewed After Denial of Enforcement of Board\u27s  Runaway Shop  Remedy in Garwin by Bowman, E. Walter
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 20 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - October 1967 Article 3 
10-1967 
Plant Relocation: Viewed After Denial of Enforcement of Board's 
"Runaway Shop" Remedy in Garwin 
E. Walter Bowman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
E. Walter Bowman, Plant Relocation: Viewed After Denial of Enforcement of Board's "Runaway Shop" 
Remedy in Garwin, 20 Vanderbilt Law Review 1062 (1967) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol20/iss5/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
area of foreign commerce antitrust law, and thus lead to a more ac-
curate determination of the intended extraterritorial reach of the
Sherman Act.
W. BRADFORD REYNOLDS
Plant Relocation: Viewed After Denial of
Enforcement of Board's "Runaway Shop"
Remedy in Carwin
I. INTRODUCTION
Plant relocation-the transfer of all or a portion of plant operations
to another site-can present two distinct categories of labor relations
problems: (1) unfair labor practice problems under the National
Labor Relations Act ("runaway shop" problems); and (2) problems
of interpreting and applying a collective bargaining agreement.'
While this note deals mainly with plant removal as an unfair labor
practice, unionized employers must consider both problems care-
fully before embarking upon a relocation of operations. Miscalcula-
tions or ignorance of the consequences of certain relocation proced-
ure can result in the imposition of liability sufficient to cause the
employer to rue the day he decided to move. Likewise union coun-
sel must be vigorous and watchful in protecting labor's rights-
NLRA rights and contract rights-in the plant removal situation.
The occasion for consideration of the plant removal problem is
the recent case of Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB (Garwin
Corp.) ,2 involving a corporate manufacturer which moved its plant
from New York to Miami, Florida, for the primary purpose, as the
Board found, of ridding itself of a vexatious labor union.3 On appeal,
1. The first category, to which this note is primarily devoted, is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board.
The Board does not, generally speaking, operate in the field of contract interpretation or
implementation (the second category); and breach of a labor contract is not, of itself,
an unfair labor practice, though an unfair labor practice may also be a breach of
contract.
2. 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967), enforcing in
part & rev'g in part sub nom. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965).
3. Respondents were found to have closed their New York bathing suit manufacturing
concern, Carwin Corp., and subsequently to have reopened it under the new corporate
name S'Agaro, Inc., in Florida. The trial examiner concluded, and the Board agreed,
that S'Agaro, Inc. was the alter ego of Garwin Corp., on the basis of the following
facts: S'Agaro was capitalized with money drawn from Garwin; the two carried on
substantially identical operations, even producing some of the same lines; and equipment
was moved from the New York plant to Florida. The trial examiner based his findings
of discriminatory motivation on direct evidence of anti-union bias and hostility, on
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the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denied enforce-
ment to that portion of the Board's order which directed the runaway
employer to bargain with the aggrieved union on request at the
Florida plant, without the usual requirement of a showing of ma-
jority support.4 The remainder of the order, directing back pay and
an offer of reinstatement at the new plant, with travel and moving
expenses to Florida provided, was enforced. While most of the inter-
est in Garwin centers around the court's refusal to enforce the Board's
novel remedy, the case is an appropriate vehicle for considering the
broader problem of plant removal, with particular emphasis on the
runaway shop.
II. WHEN DOES PLANT RELOCATION VIOLATE T=E ACT?
An employer may have a number of personal or economic reasons
for desiring to transfer to another location, including lower wages,
lower taxes, and accessibility of natural and human resources and
markets. The Board has long held that an employer commits an
unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA 6 when he closes a plant at one locality and moves it to an-
other for the purpose of avoiding his obligations under the Act.7
Findings of 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) violations are usually accompanied
concealment from the union of plans for the move, and on the inadequacy of the
economic explanations offered by the company. The Board adopted the examiner's
findings: "[W]e agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusions that Respondents violated
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by
the dosing of their New York facility, discharging their employees, and removing said
operations to Miami, Florida, for the purpose of depriving said employees of rights
guaranteed by section 7 of the Act .... " 153 N.L.R.B. at 664.
4. The trial examiner had recommended imposition of the traditional remedy, re-
instatement and back pay, while at the same time remarking upon its ineffectiveness,
in this situation, in depriving respondents of the fruits of their wrong. The Board
modified the recommended order "to require Respondents to recognize and bargain
with the union, on request, wherever Respondents ultimately decide to locate." 153
N.L.R.B. at 666.
5. In addition to the unfair labor practice remedy imposed, Garwin could well have
been vulnerable to a substantial award of damages had its precipitous removal violated
an existing collective bargaining agreement. Additionally, employers like Garwin could
find their objectives thwarted by a finding that the labor contract, or at least some
employee rights under the contract, continue in effect at the new site. These contract
aspects of plant removal will be considered in Part IV of this note.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (3) (1964). These sections forbid employer inter-
ference, restraint, coercion or discrimination which infringes upon the free exercise of
employee rights guaranteed in section 7. Under section 7, "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization . . . to bargain collectively . . . and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . and shall also have the
right to refrain from any and all such activities . . .." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
7. The Board found little to distinguish this conduct from the firing of employees for
union activities. NLRB v. Winchester Electronics, Inc., 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961);
Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948); Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
by the finding of an 8(a) (5) violation,8 predicated upon the em-
ployer's refusal to bargain in good faith about the impact of relocation
upon employees in the unit. Thus, not only is anti-union relocation
itself unlawful, but the employer's avoidance of bargaining about the
effects of the change may also subject him to liability.
It is important to note that plant relocation, in itself, is not an
unfair labor practice, even when the move is into a non-union
setting and has the consequent effect of ridding the employer of a
labor union. Relocation violates the Act only when it is carried out
with the intent and for the purpose of avoiding one's obligations
under the Act,9 or, stated differently, because of "union animus." These
are statements of a legal conclusion which must be drawn from a
compilation of evidence.
Unlike some other unfair labor practices, the issue of guilt does
not turn upon the effect of the move upon the employees or the
union; rather, the issue is simply why the employer moved-his
motive or intent. The question is one of causation, and, as seen in
tort law, causation can be a formidable subject. In the typical run-
away shop case, the charging union will present evidence tending to
show that the employer moved wholly or primarily out of a desire
to escape the union or impending unionization.10 The employer at-
tempts to refute a prima facie case of union causation indirectly, by
showing that other reasons, usually economic, existed for the move.
These economic reasons for relocating, he contends, were in them-
selves sufficient cause to move, and were, in fact, the cause of the
relocation, independent of labor troubles. Economic woes at the
old site, coupled with attractive business prospects elsewhere, are
8. Section 8(a) (5) defines the duty "to bargain collectively" about wages, hours,
and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964). Because an employer
whose move is prompted by union animus is not likely to inform the union of his plans
beforehand, much less negotiate about them, the 8(a) (5) charge is common in
relocation cases. The still-developing law of duty to bargain about the decision to
relocate is discussed later in this note.
9. Glushien, Plant Removal, 1962 N.Y.U. 15Tn ANN. CoNF. ON LAn. L. 237, 255-56
1962.
10. Union animus as a basis for the move is difficult to prove in a "clean" situation.
But where the parties have a long history of labor trouble, and particularly where the
employer has warned employees about moving or closing, or committed other separate
unfair labor practices, circumstantial evidence and incriminating statements may be
abundant. At present, it appears that very nearly the only way an employer who
moves in the midst of a "dirty" situation can win before the Board is to show that a
final economic decision to move was made before the onset of labor troubles. In
Israel Taub, 145 N.L.R.B. 682 (1963), the Board exonerated an employer who moved
his textile operation in the midst of a union's organizing 'campaign and strike. The
Board held that the union activity, and its ruinous demands, merely renforced an
earlier economic decision to move, but cautioned that a removal in the context of an
economic strike will be scrutinized very carefully. It should be noted that the threat
to close or relocate may itself violate the Act, whether carried out or not, but this
note is confined to actual relocations as unfair labor practices.
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cited. Thus, the employer usually proceeds with the approach that
while some union troubles and hostility admittedly existed, they were
not "the cause" of the move.
These contentions present the Board with a typical case of "mixed
motivation."' The pattern is familiar: the company is doing poorly,
and, as often as not, union troubles and hostility are factors in the
generally unfavorable economic picture. The company moves, usually
with little or no notice to the union. Out of these circumstances, the
Board has had to determine whether union animus was sufficiently
important, in the employer's decision, to violate the Act. The sub-
jective nature of this inquiry into motive has afforded the courts of
appeal many opportunities to reconsider inferences drawn by the
NLRB and to reverse the Board decision, as is seen in the following
cases.
In Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 2 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit declined to enforce a Board order directed
against an employer who closed his Massachusetts textile mill shortly
before another plant in which he was heavily interested opened in
North Carolina. The alleged move occurred immediately after a labor
union had begun an intensive organizing campaign at respondents
plant and had petitioned for a representation election. The court
pointed to evidence of long-standing economic setbacks and previous
sentiment for moving, and concluded that union animus was not the
primary motivating factor in the move. Setting the pattern for later
decisions, the court found that while the appearance of the union
may have expedited the decision to close, as an added business pres-
sure, this fact was not sufficient to support the Board's determina-
tion.13 A similar approach was taken by the Second Circuit in Rapid
Bindery, Inc. v. NLRB.14 The court held that where sound economic
reasons are shown for the move, the fact that the decision is "accele-
rated or reinforced by contemporaneous ... differences with a union"
does not demonstrate a violation of the Act.' 5 During the period
1954-1961, included by the above decisions, several other circuits
followed a similar approach and reversed Board determinations on
11. Glushien, supra note 9, at 248.
12. 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954).
13. The court in Mount Hope also reVersed the Board's findings that the North
Carolina mill was the alter ego of the Massachusetts corporation, on the grounds that
sufficient continuity of ownership was not shown. Thus the Court found in effect
that there was no transfer, apparently laying two independent grounds for reversal.
The problem of what is a "move"-that is, how much continuity is required to charac-
terize a new plant at a new site as the alter ego of the old business-is not treated here.
14. 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
15. I& at 174.
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the basis of mixed motivation, in which they found that bona fide
economic considerations predominated.
16
This remarkable record of reversals sustained by the Board in the
mixed motivation area suggests that one of two things is happening:
either the Board and the courts are applying different standards, or
they are differing as to the application of the test being applied."7
The language of the circuit court cases discussed above indicates that
union animus' 8 can be a factor in the decision to transfer, so long as
there are other substantial economic factors which in themselves
would be good and sufficient reasons for relocation. In other words,
the courts seem to be applying a "but for" test'R-if removal would
not have been carried out but for union activity, then the union was
a contributing cause sufficient to violate the Act; otherwise it was not.
The Board, on the other hand, seems to apply a test less strict than
16. The following three cases involve partial closure of operations, allegedly for
union animus, rather than plant relocation, but the issues and standards applied are
the same. Jay Foods, Inc. v. NLBB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961) (abolition of auto
repair department); NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 909 (1961) (termination of trucking operations); NLRB v. Houston
Chronicle Pub. Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954) (discontinuance of department and
substitution of independent contractors). In the recent case of Thompson Transp.
Co., 65 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1967), the closure of a trucking terminal was found not
discriminatorily motivated, even though it followed a successful union campaign in
which several threats of closure were made. Overriding economic considerations were
shown. But the Board imposed an 8(a)(5) charge for failure to bargain about effects
of the closure. See also NLBB v. R. C. Mahon Co., 269 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1959);
NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955). Cf. Phillips v. Burlin-
game Indus., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Ga. 1961).
17. If the former is correct, that the courts are differing with the Board as to the
applicable test, then de novo court review of the questions of law seems appropriate.
But if the two are merely disagreeing as to the application of the same test, under
given facts, then the courts would seem to be exceeding the scope of review accorded
them by § 10(d) and Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), for the
latter involves the reweighing of factual emphasis and competing interests, which should
be accorded the weight of Board expertise. See Sheinkman, note 18 infra, at 91.
18. The Board's own term "union animus" is used in this note. "Animus" is used by
the Board in its meaning of ill will or hostility. The term is not used, or should not be
used, in its alternative meaning of "animating force or principle." This definition would
equate union animus with union causation, and simple union causation is not sufficient
to violate the Act. If union animus is used in this second sense, "anti-union animus"
would be a more appropriate term. The latter term is sometimes seen in the literature.
Union causation, such as moving to a low-wage area because of high wages exacted
by a vigorous union, is not proscribed, even though at least one commentator thinks
it should be. Sheinkman, Plant Removal Under the National Labor Relations Acts,
1963 N.Y.U. 16T-H ANN. CoNF. oN LAB. L. 81, 87-88. Apparently union animus
refers to employer motives directed at depriving employees of their § 7 rights, though
this definition may prove circular and not very helpful.
19. In applying the "but for" principle, the courts reason as follows: under the
facts, the decision to relocate (or close, or subcontract) would have been made
shortly even without the presence of union activity; or, even if some union activity
were required to give final impetus to the decisions, there was so much economic
justification for the decision other than union activity that this activity could hardly
be called a substantial cause. Sheinkman, supra note 18, at 93.
the "but for" standard; a "substantial contributing cause" test would
better characterize its view. This approach is seen in the trial exam-
iner's decision, later adopted by the Board, in Rapid Bindery.20 The
examiner, after considering respondents defense of economic justifi-
cation, appeared to concede that "some readjustment was necessary,"
but refused "to appraise the merits of the economic reasons ad-
vanced."21 Evidence that management had been looking for a new
site for some time, that the present site was unreasonable and un-
profitable for a number of reasons, and that a move was probably
inevitable, was not a sufficient defense. The fact that the actual
decision to move was made after a union vote, and in the context
of threats and warnings about closing the plant, was, in the exam-
iner's opinion, sufficient to demonstrate violation of the Act. Thus,
in Rapid Bindery, the Board found that unionization was a substantial
contributing cause of the move, notwithstanding the inevitability of
a move for other reasons.
Before the court of appeals, the application of the "but for" test
led to reversal. 22 The court found that factors other than union
animus were sufficient, independently, to justify the move and had,
in fact, already made a move in the near future inevitable. Thus,
under this approach, the respondent was exonerated by showing that
absent the union activity, the move would have occurred anyway, and
the fact that the decision was "accelerated" by union troubles did
not change the result.
A minority view is represented by the Eighth Circuit, which, in
NLRB v. Missouri Transit Co.,2 did not subject the Board's determi-
nation to such a high standard of scrutiny. "These issues [as to
whether the operation was sold for economic or anti-union motives]
were, under the evidence, issues of fact for the Trial Examiner and
the Board to determine, and not questions of law for this court .... "2 4
By treating the issue of requisite motive as one of fact, the court
severely restricted review of the issue.
Plant removal, subcontracting and plant closure bear an obviously
close relationship to each other when analyzed from the standpoint
of the interests of the workers affected. In all three cases, a segment
of employees faces loss of employment because of a managerial de-
cision to close down some or all operations at a given site. The Board
has held for several years that most decisions to subcontract work
formerly done within the bargaining unit are mandatory bargaining
20. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960).
21. Id at 219.
22. Rapid Bindery, Inc. v. NLRB, 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
23. 250 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1957).
24. Id. at 262-63.
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subjects. In Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 6 this view
gained qualified acceptance by the Supreme Court.27 In the recent
decision of Ozark Trailers, Inc.,'2 the Board applied the Fibreboard-
Town & Country29 rationale to the closure of one plant of an inte-
grated enterprise, holding that an employer was required to bargain
about the decision to close one of its plants, as well as about the
effects of the shutdown. And in the Garwin case the duty to bargain
was applied to the plant removal situation.30 In view of the analytical
parallels in the three situations-subcontracting, closure and removal-
this aspect of the Garwin decision should have surprised no one; it
25. The Board and the courts have long recognized the duty to bargain about the
effects or impact of closure, subcontracting and relocation upon employees. NLRB v.
Rapid Bindery, Inc., supra note 22, at 176; Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 160 N.L.R.B.
No. 72 (1966). However, there has been little judicial acceptance of the duty to
bargain about the decision itself. The Board first established the principle that an
employer must bargain about the decision to subcontract in Town & Country Mfg. Co.,
136 N.L.R.B. 1022, enfd, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). The Board guidelines laid
out in Westinghouse Electric Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965), for determining what
kind of subcontracting is within the duty, are broad enough to cover most decisions
to subcontract unit work. See also National Food Stores, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 341 (1963),
Hawaii Meat Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 966 (1962).
26. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
27. In Fibreboard the Court held that the subcontracting of work formerly done
within the bargaining unit, where no significant capital investment is involved, is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. While some of the language in Fibreboard
is quite broad and subject to an expansive interpretation, the Court apparently refrained
from going beyond the facts of the case and approving the Board's Town and Country
doctrine, that all subcontracting is within the duty to bargain. See Town & Country
Mfg. Co., supra note 25. The three concurring Justices insisted that the Court was not
deciding "that every managerial decision which necessarily terminates an individual's
employment is subject to the duty to bargain. Nor does the Court decide that sub-
contracting decisions are as a general matter subject to that duty." 379 U.S. at 218.
These Justices would specifically exclude from the Fibreboard doctrine "such larger
entrepreneurial questions as ...how capital shall be invested in fixed assets.
379 U.S. at 225.
28. 161 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1966), noted in 20 VAND. L. REV. 932 (1967). The
appeal is now pending in the Eighth Circuit, which has more than once reversed the
Board by finding that a decision to subcontract involving "basic operational changes"
was not a mandatory bargaining subject. Adams Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 553
(8th Cir. 1963). It should be noted that Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), has no particular relevance to plant relocation. The
affirmation of a right to go entirely out of business for any reason has no particular
relevance to the area of plant relocation, where no absolute right to relocate for union
animus is recognized.
29. Supra note 25.
30. The 8(a) (5) violation in Garwin was based upon the employer's failure to con-
sult and bargain with the union about the decision to relocate. 153 N.L.R.B. at 664.
The court of appeals did not disturb this finding. Actually, the Board had already
imposed the duty to bargain about the decision to relocate operations in decisions
rendered some months prior to Garwin. See Spun-Jee Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 943 (1965);
Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15 (1965). See also Purolator Prods., Inc.,
160 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1966). As pointed out in the text, the Board views the plant
removal situation, like plant closure, as part of the broad "Fibreboard bargaining
obligation issue." To the Board, the duty of decision bargaining in all of these situations
is the same.
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merely rounded out the Board's -application of the Fibreboard phi-
losophy to its logical limits.
While the Board is now uniformly imposing the duty of decision
bargaining in these situations, the courts have been more hesitant
in enforcing a broad duty to bargain in any of these areas.31 The
extent to which the courts will approve the application of the Fibre-
board-Ozark Trailers rationale to plant removal, to raise a duty to
bargain about the decision to move, is unclear. Plant relocation is
probably outside the strict language of Fibreboard (certainly out-
side the concurring opinion),3 because relocation seems to be a
peculiarly "entrepreneurial" decision involving major capital reallo-
cation. But there is enough open-ended language in the Fibreboard
majority opinion to permit the Board to continue to view plant re-
moval, like subcontracting and plant closure, as within the manda-
tory bargaining area. Most courts of appeal will probably agree. Thus,
one may expect the Fibreboard line of cases to provide a continuing
basis for the Board to find 8(a) (5) violations for the refusal to
bargain about the decision to move.
III. Bo~mn REMRDIES FOR nia RuNAWAY SHOP
The NLRA gives the Board broad discretion to fashion appropriate
remedies in runaway shop situationsm though the courts have im-
posed certain limitations.3 4 The runaway shop remedial order was
established quite early, and soon became standard.35 The employer
is ordered, at his option, either to reinstate his operation at the old
site, or, alternatively, to permit reinstatement at the new site with
reasonable moving expenses for the discriminatees and their families.
Employees who cannot immediately be absorbed at the new site are
placed on preferential hiring lists. Back pay36 is awarded to compen-
sate the discriminatees for lost wages. This either-or alternative ap-
31. Supra notes 25, 27 & 28.
32. The concurring opinion in Fibreboard emphasized that the decision was not
to be interpreted as sweeping all subcontracting decisions within the mandatory bar-
gaining sphere. The 'larger entrepreneureal questions" involving substantial capital
investment and reallocation were still to be considered prerogatives of management. 379
U.S. at 225. See also note 27 supra.
33. NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
34. See note 43 infra.
35. See note 6 supra.
36. The amount of back pay liability will naturally vary greatly with the individual
case. Had the Fourth Circuit upheld the Board's determination in Mount Hope Finish-
ing Co., supra note 12, it is estimated that total back pay liability would have
'approached two million dollars. Glushien, supra note 9, at 238. In some cases, the
"Board gave the employee the option of moving his family or of being afforded biweekly
trips to visit his family, either, of course, at the employer's expense. Jacob H. Klotz,
13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939).
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proach has become traditional, with some minor variations to fit
particular facts.37
The Board's order is usually accompanied by a conditional bargain-
ing order requiring the employer to bargain at the new location as
soon as the union establishes a majority there. But, with the ex-
ception of one narrow class of cases, where the employer has moved
only a short distance,38 the Board has never ordered the runaway
employer to bargain unconditionally at the new site upon request of
the discriminatee union, without any showing of majority represen-
tation. In these cases the unconditional bargaining order is based
upon the assumption that had it not been for the employer's unfair
labor practices, enough employees would have transferred to the new
site to re-establish the union's majority status there. Thus the Board
37. Formerly, back pay liability was always terminated when the discriminatee was
either reinstated or placed on a preferential hiring list. Beginning with Bonnie Lass
Knitting Mills, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 1396 (1960), and Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133
N.L.R.B. 547 (1961), the Board began awarding back pay from the time of the
closure until the discriminatee either accepted reinstatement or obtained substantially
equivalent employment elsewhere. Glushien, supra note 9, at 254. Yet the Board
continues to exercise considerable flexibility in applying its back-pay remedy. In cases
where the sole violation is an 8(a)(5) (failure to bargain about an economically
motivated move), the back pay liability is still terminated when reinstatement is
offered. Where an 8(a)(1) discriminatory motive is involved, the liability may be
continued until the discriminatee either accepts the reinstatement offer or finds
equivalent employment. Other variations are seen in Standard Handkerchief Co.,
supra note 30, and Spun-Jee Corp., supra note 30.
38. California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765, enfd, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957),
involved an employer who moved twelve miles across the Los Angeles area, and, as
the Board found, "utilize[d] the move as an opportunity to get rid of the union ... "
The employer's refusal to bargain at the new site was held to violate § 8(a)(5).
The Board placed the burden upon the employer to present "affirmative evidence
that a majority of the .. . employees would not have transferred . . . if respondents
had fulfilled their obligations under the Act .... ." The Board found the case to be
one where the "union's loss of majority was directly attributable to respondent's unfair
labor practices," and ordered respondent to bargain on request with the union at the
new site. See dissenting opinion of Chairman Brown, who considered the approach of
Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., infra, applicable here. The Board went the other
way in Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953), and declined
to order a runaway employer, who had moved a distance of over thirty miles, to
bargain at the new site: "We cannot assume, however, that even if such agreement
had been reached, Charlotte employees would have transferred to Monroe in numbers
sufficient to constitute a majority of the employee complement at the Monroe plant....
we do not believe we should attribute to the union statutory bargaining representative
status in the absence of affirmative evidence that a majority of employees at the
Monroe plant have, in fact, designated the union as their bargaining representative."
Though Brown can be distinguished as involving only an 8(a)(5) charge, it seemed
to suggest that a thirty-mile move was past the outer limits for the application of an
order to bargain on request, at least prior to the new direction of the Garwin case.
An order to bargain on request at the new site was also imposed, without accompany-
ing discussion, in Rapid Bindery, Inc., supra note 20, also a short-distance relocation
case. The Board's findings of anti-union motivation were set aside and the bargaining
order was denied enforcement in the process, though the appropriateness of the bar-
gaining order was not specifically dealt with. Rapid Bindery, Inc. v. NLRB, 293 F.2d
170 (2d Cir. 1961).
has viewed these short-distance relocations as within that class of
cases where the employer's unfair labor practices have eliminated the
union's majority status.39 In such circumstances, the Board has often
required the employer to bargain with what was, because of his
wrongdoing, a minority union.
This background brings us to the remedy imposed in the Garwin
case. Here, for the first time, an employer who had moved a great
distance was ordered to bargain on request at the new site, without
regard to majority status. In making the order, the Board relaxed
its normal contract bar rules by providing that unless the union re-
established its majority, any collective bargaining agreement arrived
at would serve as a bar for only one year.
The Board was very much aware that the remedy imposed inter-
fered with the free choice of employees at the new site, but on
balance, the Board felt that the rights of employees "whose very
jobs" exist "by virtue of ...Respondent's unfair labor practices"
should not be preferred at the expense of an effective bargaining
order.40
The Board recognized that the traditional remedies had proven
inadequate to deal with runaway companies like Garwin. In the
Board's view, the traditional remedy did not serve to deter em-
ployers who aspired to escape the union by distant relocation. Be-
cause it is highly improbable that enough employees to re-establish
the union's majority status will elect to accept reinstatement at some
distant site, the company is being permitted to achieve its "primary
illegal objective"-escape from the collective bargaining agreement4
and the establishment of a non-union shop. The employer may de-
termine that permanent relocation in a non-union area may well be
worth the temporary expense of traditional Board remedies. The
39. NLRB v. National Plastics Prods. Co., 175 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1949); Delight
Bakery, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 893 (1964); Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B.
192 (1954).
40. "In the circumstances, the interests of newly hired employees whose very jobs,
and hence statutory protection, exists by virtue of: (1) Respondents' unfair labor
practices, (2) the Board's unwillingness to order the return of the plant to its original
location, and (3) the failure of the discriminatees to displace them by accepting rein-
statement, should not be preferred at the expense of a bargaining order which will
dissipate and remove the consequences of a deliberate violation of statutory obliga-
tions. On balance, therefore, their interests must yield to the statutory objective of
fashioning a meaningful remedy for the unfair labor practices found." 153 N.L.R.B.
at 666.
41. There is no indication that the Board's order contemplates the re-establishment
or continuance of a labor contract at the new site. In fact, the collective bargaining
agreement at Garwin Corp. had expired some time before the removal. Thus, while
the Garwin remedy orders the employer to bargain in good faith, it cannot assure a
labor contract at the new site. And the weak bargaining position of a minority union,




Garwin remedy appears to defeat such objectives by virtually as-
suring the re-establishment of the union at the new location for at
least one year, even if not permanently.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit denied enforcement
to the order to bargain on request. The court affimed the Board's
findings of violations of section 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act
and enforced other portions of the order which imposed the tra-
ditional back pay-reinstatement remedies. Viewing the right to choose
a union and have it operate free from coercion as the "cornerstone
of the Act," the court held that the order clearly infringed upon the
section 7 rights42 of the employees at the new site by depriving
them of the opportunity to bargain collectively through represen-
tatives of their own choosing, or to refrain from such activities alto-
gether. While section 7 rights should not be considered absolute,
to the exclusion of all others, nevertheless, in the court's view, these
rights should not be infringed unless sufficient justification is shown in
protecting other equally vital interests. The countervailing interest
here is clearly that of deterring this type of employer conduct. The
court viewed this object as essentially "punitive" rather than remedial,
since it does not compensate the discriminatees or restore the status
quo as to them. Rather, the order is intended to punish an employer
by depriving him of the fruits of his wrongdoing, and to serve as a
deterrent to others. And because the Act has been repeatedly in-
terpreted as being remedial rather than punitive,43 the court con-
cluded that the order does not properly effectuate the policies of
the Act.4 Thus, the required justification for infringing vital section
7 rights failed altogether, and the court refused to permit a largely
punitive order to override these rights.
Judge McGowan dissented from that portion of the opinion which
denied enforcement to the Board's bargaining order. He agreed with
the majority that two conflicting policies were clearly presented, but
he reasoned that the court's proper scope of review should extend
42. See note 8 supra.
43. It has been held that the purpose for Board remedies is to rectify the harm done
injured employees, not to provide punitive measures against errant employers.
"[T]he power to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive." Republic
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940). And deterrence alone is not a proper
basis for a remedy. NLRB v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1957).
"This authority to order affirmative action does not go so far as to confer a punitive
jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon the employer any penalty it may choose
because he is engaged in unfair labor practices, even though the Board be of the
opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectuated by such an order." Con-
solidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235 (1938).
44. "The Board's order will not be disturbed unless it can be shown that the order
is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to
effectuate the policies of the Act." Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203, 216 (1964).
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no further than determining whether the accommodation reached
here was "within the range of the Board's primary authority to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act."45 He felt that the Board's resolution
was within this range, and that the court should thus defer to Board
expertise in striking a balance between competing interests, rather
than reweighing the competing interests in order to reach a different
result. In Judge McGowan's view, the Board should be accorded the
broad scope of remedial inventiveness envisioned by section 10(c).46
Not usually deterred by one circuit court reversal, the Board may
well persist in applying its new bargain-on-request remedy in ap-
propriate cases. But if other circuits follow the precedent set here,47
what other appropriate remedies are available to the Board to deal
with the runaway shop problem in a more effective manner?48 The
only other readily apparent deterrent is the order to relocate at the
old site, without the reinstatement-back pay alternative now accorded
the employer. This order could be selectively employed where such a
relocation is economically feasible, with the burden on the employer
to prove undue hardship from such an order. While potentially trau-
matic for the runaway employer, the "move back" order would meet
the remedial standard49 in that it would restore the employees at the
old site to the status quo. Nevertheless, it is submitted that such an
order would likely be denied enforcement by most courts of appeal as
being too drastic and punitive,50 in spite of its remedial aspects. Thus
the Board may be stymied in its attempt to fashion a more effective
45. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
46. The Board's remedial power is "a broad, discretionary one, subject to limited
judicial review.... Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 44, at 216.
See also NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
47. The District of Columbia Circuit is one of the Board's "friendliest" in terms of
percentage of reversals; thus reversal here, more than in other circuits, may portend
reversal elsewhere. And the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, supra note 2, tends
to strengthen the precedent.
48. The Garwin remedy, had it been allowed to stand, may not have been as
effective in practice as it first appears on paper. Meaningful bargaining presupposes
parties of some relative strength, but a minority union, lacking any broad support, may
be unable to gain any concessions of consequence from the employer. This state of
affairs could irrevocably damage and humiliate the union. See note 41 supra.
49. Cases cited note 43 supra.
50. The Board has never unconditionally ordered a moveback of a wholly relocated
plant. Glushien, supra note 9, at 254. But an order to restore subcontracted operations
was upheld in Fibreboard, and has been employed by the Board in other cases. See
NLRB v. Kelley & Piceme, Inc., 298 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Brown-Dunkin
Co., 287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961). The subcontracted work in Fibreboard involved
little capital investment or integration into- plant operations, and was formerly per-
formed by unit employees, so that its reinstatement did not entail undue hardship.
But the exorbitant expense of dismantling and shipping a whole plant, or of resuming
operations at a stripped factory, is obvious. And the courts have traditionally been
hostile to orders which appear excessive or which upset the basic entrepreneureal direc-
tion of a business.
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remedy,51 which will assure sufficient deterrence to overcome the at-
traction of freedom from the union and an existing collective bargain-
ing contract.
IV. NON-UNFAIR LABOR PRAC ,CE ASPECTS OF PLANT REMOvAL
The thrust of the discussion above has necessarily been confined to
only one facet of the plant removal problem-the unfair labor practice
aspects under the NLRA. But there is another side to this problem
which is as important, for even though a move is carried out for
bona fide economic reasons, after good faith bargaining, the labor
contract aspect of plant removal remains to be reckoned with. This
labor contract aspect can itself be subdivided into two areas: (1)
plant relocation as a violation of an existing collective bargaining
agreement; and (2) contract and contract rights' survival at the new
plant.
If an employer moves his plant without the consent of the union,
in violation of a contract clause prohibiting or restricting removal,52
he is vulnerable to legal action on the contract. The union may
proceed against the breaching employer through the arbitration pro-
cess, if the issue of breach is arbitrable, or through the courts in a
section 301 suit.53 The union may seek damagesM an order enjoining
the move, an order compelling the employer to move back to the old
site,55 or a combination of damages and such specific relief. The
awards granted unions against intentionally breaching employers have
on occasion been quite large, combining staggering damages with
specific orders to return to the old site, or giving an employer an
election as to one or the other.5 6 The courts and arbitrators in such
51. The Board's dilemma is caused by the fact that the deterrence required to prevent
the runaway shop must be much greater than the immediate economic harm actually
done to the discriminatees; and yet the Act, as construed, does not permit punitive
measures over and above restoration to the status quo.
52. Most suits are on express no-removal provisions, but occasionally the promise
not to move is implied from a subcontracting clause or seniority clause in the labor
contract. See note 54 infra.
53. Labor-Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § I85(a) (1964). See Local
127, Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962).
54. Selb Mfg. Co., 61-3 CCH LAB. Aim. AwAuDs II 7111 (1961) (no explicit no-
removal clause; decision based on provision restricting subcontracting). Sec also
NLRB v. Winchester Electronics, Inc., 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961). Because the
measure of damages employed by the courts and the arbitrators roughly parallels that
used by the Board, cases from all these sources may be cited as generally representative
of damage awards.
55. Address-O-Mat, Inc., 61-1 CCH LAB. Anm. AwAims ff 3773 (1961); Dubinsky v.
Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y.S. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
56. In Sidele Fashions, Inc., 61-3 CCH LAB. Aim. AwAmDs f 6202 (1961), the
arbitrator awarded sums exceeding $78,000, with a possibility of awards exceeding
$355,000 if the employer did not elect to move back to Philadelphia from North
Carolina. See Glushien, supra note 9, at 238.
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cases have freely employed the specific relief remedy, which the
Board has refrained from applying in unfair labor practice cases.57
Another perplexing problem, particularly in light of recent develop-
ments, concerns the question of contract survival or continuance:
When will an existing labor contract continue in effect at the new
site? Or if the whole contract does not survive, what of the con-
tract rights of individual employees transferring with the plant? In
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, the Supreme Court held that
arbitration rights under a collective bargaining agreement survived
the sale and merger of a business into a larger non-union concern. 58
The basic holding was that a change in ownership of a business should
not, of itself, be a basis for upsetting the stream of industrial govern-
ment. By analogy, the Wiley rationale may be applied to plant re-
moval, at least where the employees, processes' and equipment re-
main largely unchanged by the move. But, of course, most plant
relocations over any appreciable distance entail a substantial turn-
over in personnel, so the question becomes one of deciding how much
change in personnel, and in other aspects of the industrial commun-
ity,59 is required to vitiate the collective bargaining agreement. When
the matter has been considered, courts and arbitrators have differed
widely.60 As for individual rights of transferees, most courts have
recognized in individual employees certain "vested rights" which may
survive the termination of the contract itself or at least continue in
effect at a relocated site as to employees transferring under the con-
tract. Retirement pension, vacation and severence pay are usually
57. See notes 50 & 55 supra.
58. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). The arbitration rights survived notwithstanding an express
clause in the sales agreement that the purchaser does not assume the seller's labor
contract with the union.
59. In determining whether the contract survives as a bar to other representational
activity at the new site, the Board looks to the following factors-
(1) number of employees transferring to the new plant;
(2) distance of new to old plant;
(3) similarity of functions, processes and goods produced;
(4) amount of machinery and fixtures actually transferred;
(5) identity of supervisory and managerial personnel.
60. In Lion Match Co., 40 BNA LAB. Aim. R P. 1 (1963), Arbitrator Schieber,
analogizing from the Board's contract bar rules, expressed the opinion that an existing
labor contract should follow a plant if thirty per cent of the employees are transferred
to the new site. Compare General Elec. Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 150' (1949), with General
Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958) ("[A] mere relocation of operations, accom-
panied by a transfer of a considerable portion of the employees to another plant,
without an accompanying change in the character of the jobs and the functions of
the employees to another plant in the contract unit, does n t remove the contract
as a bar" (emphasis added)). See Yale Rubber Mfg. Co., 24 L.R.R.M. 1372 (1949)
(labor contract still in effect where 70 of new plant's 150 employees are transferees);
United Packers, Inc., 38 BNA LAB. AnB. REP. 619 (1962) (no basis for contract survival
in move from Chicago to Louisiana).
1967 ] NOTES 1075
1076 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 20
cited as being within this category. At least one court has included
seniority rights in the classification of vested rights.61
These remarks do no more than raise some questions in this non-
unfair labor practice area of plant removal; the subject is too broad
for extensive treatment here. But counsel for an employer or a labor
union, when confronted with a real or threatened plant removal situ-
ation, must analyze his legal position from both of these standpoints-
that of the NLBA and that of the labor contract.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not an oversimplification to say that plant relocation of what-
ever kind-unfair labor practice or otherwise-is induced, ultimately,
by the profit motive. Employers move because it is in their apparent
economic interest to do so.P Proceding from this premise, to what
extent does the overall public interest coincide with the interest of
the moving employer? Or, to pose the key question, to what extent,
if any, should public policy favor the mobility of capital and capital
plant, as represented by businesses' moving from one place to an-
other?63 If it is assumed that the mobility of capital in response to
61. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd on other grounds,
370 U.S. 530 (1962). Glidden Co. moved after the expiration of the contract term,
and refused to recognize the seniority rights of those who wanted to transfer to the
new plant. The court held that seniority rights embodied in contract provisions which
guaranteed rehire rights for a specified period were "vested," and continued for at
least that period into the future. The case attracted wide attention, but a later com-
ment by a member of the court cast doubt upon the validity as precedent of its
continued liability holding. Zdanok v. Gideon Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
See 110 U. PA. L. REv. 458 (1962). Most other courts have refused to follow the
Glidden holding. Glushien, supra note 9, at 246.
62. Admittedly, some management conduct, including, presumably, plant removal, is
motivated by sheer malevolence toward unionism and the philosophy of the Wagner Act.
But when this factor is present, it is usually sublimated to economic self-interest.
However, it is not: suggested here that present treatment of those motivated by such
non-economic factors be changed.
63. A classic example of industrial migration is the southward movement of the
New England textile industry. Lower wage scales and non-wage costs, aided by such
factors as tax forgiveness and nearness to raw material sources, created an economic
differential irresistible to the industry. While Northeasterners were losing jobs,
Southerners were acquiring them in equal or (because of lower labor costs) greater
nunmbers. True, the new jobs were at substandard wages by Northeastern standards,
but the positions were quite sought-after in economically depressed, rural Southern
communities.- See H. PEnLoFr, E. Duix & E. LAMPARD, RFIONS, RESOURcEs, AND
EcoNoNMc GROWTrH (1960), especially 416-24. Putting regional and individual self-
interest aside, the net long-term result of this transfer of capital appears positive:
a more favorable regional economic balance and cost-price ratio, which implies greater
efficiency of capital and lower consumer prices. See H. PnLoFr, How A REON
GRows 121 (1963). To prevent, delay or hinder this mobility of business to seek
out the geographical area where capital can operate most efficiently is economically
unsound. It might be argued that the short-term nature of labor contracts (e.g., three-
year contract bar limitation) refutes the idea that no-removal provisions can seriously
affect mobility of business capital over any extended period of time. There is some
changing economic patterns is desirable to'the extent of generating
a general public policy in its favor, then the creation of rights and
duties which unduly restrict movement of capital should be discour-
aged and denied recognition. Of course, both types of plant relocation
-moves motivated by union animus and moves for bona fide economic
reasons-have been considered above. The Board seeks to prevent
the former; the latter are permissible, subject to any contractual re-
strictions (no-removal provisions) negotiated by the parties.
Regarding the unfair labor practice cases, one sees how economic
motivation can merge into union animus in the twilight zone of
mixed motivation.6 Isolating a primary or independently suffcient
motive, in the context of economic distress and labor troubles, is neces-
sarily subjective, thus contributing to the Board's high reversal rate
in this area.65 Viewing these evidentiary difficulties against the back-
ground of economic policy adverted to earlier, might not the cure at
times be worse than the disease? It is submitted that the Board should
be wary of overly penalizing employers who move to more "desirable"
areas, unless union animus and personal vendetta (as opposed to
economic factors aggravated by the union) are the predominant mo-
tives, or unless the employer has overtly exploited the move to chill
unionism.
In regard to the second class of cases, where the motives are clearly
economic and not anti-union, a further proposition is submitted:
Might not no-removal provisions in labor contracts-at least those
absolutely prohibiting removal during the term-be denied enforce-
ment as contrary to public policy? Standard contract law contains
numerous instances where courts refuse to enforce otherwise valid
contract provisions on grounds of public policy, even economic public
policy,66 but no cases were found in which a provision of a labor
contract has been denied enforcement on such grounds. It is some-
what anomalous that in a field which is more cluttered with statutory
restrictions than ordinary contract law, contracting parties are given
such free reign in this regard. A compromise view would be to deny
specific enforcement to bans on relocation. Thus, workers would still
be protected from the impact of relocation by compensatory damage
awards, and yet businesses would not be so irrevocably tied to one
place regardless of economic pressures. And, at the very least, arbi-
trators should be wary of implying promises not to relocate from
merit in the point, but in many situations it is unrealistic to talk about dropping a
provision, in which one party has a real interest, from a labor contract. Once inserted,
they can only be eliminated by hard bargaining or a strike-and why should the
parties be required to do battle over a provision which shouldn't be-accorded en-
forcement anyway because it doesn't comport with public policy?
64. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
66. A. CoRBni, CoNTRAcs §§ 1374, 1375 (1952).
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